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PREFACE 
 
The Glucksman Institute for Research in Securities Markets awards fellowships each year to 
outstanding second year Stern MBA students to work on independent research projects under a 
faculty member's supervision. Two research projects completed by the Glucksman Fellows of 
2003-2004 are included in this special issue of the Finance Department Working Paper Series. 
These papers focus on important topics in empirical finance. 
Jennifer McCabe, under the supervision of Richard Levich, examines the ability of economic 
derivative auction markets to predict three types of monthly macroeconomic data releases: the 
ISM Manufacturing Index, Non-farm Payrolls, and Retail Sales. Christian Baier, under the 
direction of Ingo Walter, studies the evolution of corporate fund-raising in Germany from a 
relationship-based approach to a capital-markets approach. These papers, reflecting the research 
effort of two outstanding Stern MBA students, are summarized in more detail in the Table of 
Contents on the next page. 
 
       William L. Silber, Director   
       Glucksman Institute     
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I. Introduction 
In late 2002, Deutsche Bank and Goldman Sachs introduced regular auctions of 
economic derivatives.  These options allow market participants to take positions on a variety of 
official macroeconomic measures, in anticipation of their scheduled announcement.  The 
statistics covered to date include U.S. Nonfarm Payrolls, Initial Jobless Claims, the Institute for 
Supply Management’s manufacturing index, the U.S. Retail Report, and the Eurozone Index of 
Consumer Prices.   
The auctions are conducted using a Pari-mutuel Derivatives Call Auction (PDCA) 
technology developed by Longitude, Inc.  The auctions last for between one to two hours and are 
typically held the day of or one day prior to the actual data release.  While the auction is in 
progress, investors can enter limit orders to buy or sell digital or vanilla options.  The digital 
options offer a $1 payout per contract if the actual release is at or above (for calls) or below (for 
puts) the strike, while vanilla options offer a payout of $1 per point the actual release is above or 
below the strike.  The available strikes for each auction are determined in advance by the auction 
sponsors (Deutsche Band and Goldman Sachs).  The available strikes center around economist 
consensus estimates and express a range of possible outcomes for the announced figure.      
Using the limit orders received during the auction, the PDCA technology calculates a 
unique equilibrium price for the various options that will 1) maximize the premiums collected 
and 2) ensure that the premiums collected will equal the total amount to be paid out for any given 
actual release number.1  The equilibrium price of each digital option gives an indication of the 
subjective probability the market assigns to that particular option expiring in the money and, 
                                                 
1 The process by which this unique equilibrium price is calculated is outside the scope of this paper, but is explained 
in detail by Baron and Lange. 
 3
thus, gives insight into what the market expects the announced figure to be.  This figure is called 
the implied forecast.   
As the auction proceeds, auction participants have access to real time information 
displaying indicative prices and implied forecasts (final prices and implied forecasts are not 
displayed until the auction has concluded).  These figures are updated as the auction proceeds to 
reflect incoming orders.  For example, if an auction participant expects (with high probability) 
that the released number will be higher than the current implied forecast, s/he may place an order 
for a digital call option with a strike at or near the current implied forecast.  If this order is placed 
at or above the current indicative price, it will result in an upward adjustment of the implied 
probabilities above the strike and a downward adjustment of the implied probabilities of 
outcomes below the strike.  As a result, the implied forecast will increase, expressing the revised 
view of the market taking the latest order into account.  Deutsche Bank makes available on its 
economic derivatives website (www.economicderivatives.com) post auction reports which 
summarize each auction and the final implied forecast.  Appendix I contains some examples of 
these post auction reports.   
Experience with other predictive markets, such as the Iowa Electronic Markets, suggests 
that the implied forecasts generated by these auctions may prove to be accurate predictors of the 
officially announced statistics.2  In this paper, I examine the efficacy of the economic derivatives 
market in predicting the announced numbers, particularly in comparison to economists’ 
consensus predictions.  Specifically, I examine the following four research questions:   
1) Do the auctions generate more accurate predictions than those of economists, measured 
on an absolute basis? 
                                                 
2 See Berg, Forsyth, Nelson and Rietz (2001) 
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2) If the auction predictions are not more accurate on an absolute basis, are they useful 
indicators of the surprise in a forthcoming announcement?  
3) Do the auctions generate forecasts which are more or less biased than those of 
economists? and 
4) Have the auction predictions improved over time? 
Unfortunately, given the short span of time the economic derivative markets have been in 
existence, there is limited data available and it is difficult to reach conclusions with a high degree 
of statistical significance.  My analysis of the data suggests that the auction forecasts are no 
better at predicting the actual announcements than economist consensus forecasts.  Nor are they 
useful as indicators of the direction of any potential surprise.  Both processes produced forecasts 
which were, on average, about 0.57 standard deviations from the actual announced figure.  
However, there does appear to be an interesting result relating to the degree of upward bias in the 
two types of forecasts.  While the auction and economist forecasts both tended to be overly 
optimistic, the auction forecasts appear to be less so. 
II. Data 
Data were collected from 56 auctions, held over the period October 2002 to March 2004 
and pertain to 49 actual announcements of the following measures:  ISM Manufacturing, 
Nonfarm Payrolls, and Retail Sales.3  There were seven Nonfarm Payroll announcements for 
which auctions were held both on the day of and day prior to the announcement, resulting in the 
difference between the number of announcements and the number of auctions.  An additional 22 
auctions, covering a European inflation measure, were not included because of difficulty in 
obtaining economist consensus estimates for those announcements.  Economist consensus 
                                                 
3 Auctions covering Initial Jobless Claims were introduced in February 2004.  However, because there have only 
been three auctions on this measure to date, these auctions were not included in this study.   
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estimates of the remaining three measures were collected from the Bloomberg terminal, as 
displayed on the day of the auction.  Bloomberg surveys about 50 to 60 economists on a regular 
basis and reports the resulting median estimate as the consensus forecast.  The actual announced 
statistic (not including any post-announcement revisions) was also collected from the Bloomberg 
terminal.  Table 1 summarizes the available data.  A full listing of the source data used in this 
analysis is contained in Appendix II. 
Table 1:  Summary Descriptive Statistics  
  Observations Mean St. Dev.
Announcements       
ISM Manufacturing 15 53.19 5.78
Retail Sales 16 0.37 0.63
Nonfarm Payroll 18 -17.78 104.15
Auction Forecasts       
ISM Manufacturing 15 53.23 5.08
Retail Sales 16 0.30 0.29
Nonfarm Payroll 25 46.06 85.98
Economist Forecasts       
ISM Manufacturing 15 53.52 4.91
Retail Sales 16 0.34 0.20
Nonfarm Payroll 18 38.28 70.14
Units:  ISM Manufacturing - Index 0-100; Retail Sales - % Monthly 
Change; Nonfarm Payroll - Monthly Change in Thousands 
The 56 observations cover announcements of economic statistics that are measured in 
very different ways.  The ISM number is an index, the Retail Sales figure is a percentage change, 
and the Nonfarm Payroll is an absolute change.  Accordingly, the data must first be standardized 
to allow for meaningful comparison.  The relevant statistics of interest, for each of the 56 
observations, are the magnitudes of the Auction Forecast Errors and Consensus Forecast Errors 
relative to the variation of the underlying statistic.  The Forecast Errors were obtained by 
subtracting the actual announced statistic from the auction’s implied forecast or the economist 
consensus forecast, respectively.  The Forecast Errors were then standardized by dividing the 
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Forecast Error by the standard deviation of the announced statistic between October 2002 and 
March 2003.4   
III. Accuracy of the Predictions 
The accuracy of the forecasts generated by the auctions and the economist surveys can be 
assessed by comparing the absolute values of the Standardized Errors for each observation.  The 
one-sided research hypothesis to be tested is that the mean absolute error generated by the 
auction process is less than the mean absolute error generated by economist surveys.  The null 
hypothesis, therefore, is that the mean absolute error generated by the auction is equal to (or 
greater than) that generated by the survey.  As can be seen from the paired t-test results 
summarized in Table 2, this null hypothesis cannot be rejected.  Both processes produce mean 
absolute errors about 0.57 standard deviations from the announced statistic.   
Table 2: Paired T-Test Comparing Mean Absolute Auction Forecast 
Error with Mean Absolute Consensus Forecast Error 
 Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Standard 
Error of Mean 
Auction  56 0.57 0.53 0.07 
Consensus  56 0.57 0.54 0.07 
Difference 56 -0.00 0.19 0.03 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs > 0):  T-Value = -0.05 P-Value = 0.519 
 
Similar results are obtained when this test is conducted separately for each economic 
statistic.  The auction and consensus forecasts each generated mean absolute errors of about 0.21 
for ISM releases, 0.76 for Nonfarm Payroll releases, and 0.62 for Retail Sales releases.   
IV. Predictions of the Surprise 
Although the auction forecasts do not appear from these data to provide a more accurate 
prediction of the announced statistics than consensus forecasts, an interesting question is whether 
the auctions provide an indication of the direction of the surprise element contained in the 
                                                 
4 This method of standardization follows that used by Balduzzi et al. (2001) and  Andersen et al (2003) to measure 
the surprise element in macroeconomic news announcements. 
 7
announcement.  The surprise element is typically measured as the difference between the 
announced figure and the consensus estimate.  If the auction forecast tended to be above (below) 
the consensus estimate whenever the actual figure was also above (below) the consensus figure, 
the auction could prove to be an important indicator of the direction of the coming surprise, if not 
the magnitude.  However, it turned out that the auction accurately predicted the sign of the 
surprise for only 31 of the 56 auctions, in line with what would be expected to occur by random 
chance.  As is the case with the accuracy of predictions, this result is consistent across all types 
of data releases. 
The practice of measuring the surprise element in a news announcement in this fashion 
(i.e., as the difference between the announced figure and the consensus estimate) has been the 
norm in large part because there has been no other way to measure the market’s expectation for 
the announced figure.  For this reason, much of the research measuring the impact of news 
announcements on financial markets (e.g., Balduzzi et al. (2001) on bond markets and Andersen 
et al. (2003) on foreign exchange markets) measures the correlation between the market reaction 
and the surprise as measured by economist forecasts.  However, the introduction of the economic 
derivative auctions presents an alternative measure of market expectations.  It may be interesting 
to revisit the work of Balduzzi et al. and Andersen et al., measuring the surprise component as 
the difference between the auction forecast and the announced figure and see whether this 
measure of surprise does a better or worse job of predicting the actual market impact of the news 
announcement.  Such a question is beyond the scope of this paper, but is highlighted as a 
potential area for future research.   
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V. Bias in the Predictions 
In a study of the accuracy of economists’ consensus estimates for major monthly news 
announcement, Moersch (2001) concluded that, although the forecasts tended to be fairly 
accurate, they frequently contained an element of upward bias.  Moersch finds this to be 
consistent with earlier studies of long-term forecasts, which attribute bias to strategic behavior of 
forecasters such as a reluctance to adjust predictions in light of new information for fear that 
sharp adjustments might call into question a forecaster’s original estimates and damage his/her 
standing with clients.5   
Bias is evident in a given forecasting process to the extent that the mean forecast errors 
deviate from zero.  Figures 1 and 2, shown below, contain histograms and descriptive statistics 
of the standardized forecast errors generated by the auctions and by the economists’ estimates, 
respectively. 
Figure 1: Standardized Auction Forecast Errors 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., Laster et al. (1999) and Ehrback and Waldmann (1996)  
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Figure 2: Standardized Consensus Forecast Errors 
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At first glance both distributions appear centered near zero, as would be expected.  
However, the consensus forecast errors demonstrate a more pronounced skew to the right than 
the auction forecast errors (skewness measures of 0.93 and 0.84, respectively).  In addition, the 
mean forecast error generated by the auction process is nearly 25% closer to zero than that 
generated by the consensus estimates.  The 95% confidence intervals for the true mean forecast 
errors generated under each process allow one to conclude that the consensus predictions are 
upwardly biased (i.e., significantly greater than zero), but the same cannot be said for the auction 
(because the confidence interval includes zero).   
A more rigorous test of whether the auction forecast errors are systematically less 
optimistic than the consensus estimates can be conducted using a paired t-test.  Such a test, 
summarized in Table 3, below, is borderline significant at the 5% level.  Although the auctions 
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may result in less of an upward bias, further data would need to be examined in order make a 
conclusive determination.   
Table 3: Paired T-Test Comparing the Mean Auction Forecast Error 
with the Mean Consensus Forecast Error 
 Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Standard 
Error of Mean 
Auction  56 0.17 0.76 0.10 
Consensus  56 0.21 0.77 0.10 
Difference 56 -0.04 0.19 0.03 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs < 0):  T-Value = -1.77 P-Value = 0.041 
Interestingly, similar analyses conducted for each of the three types of data 
announcements reveal varied distribution patterns for each type of announcement.  Neither the 
consensus estimates nor the auction predictions for ISM announcements generate mean forecast 
errors significantly different from zero, but a test of whether the auction forecasts are less 
pessimistic than consensus estimates is significant at the 5% level.  Mean forecast errors for 
Retail Sales announcements were also not significantly different from zero (for either process) 
and, for these announcements, a test of whether the auctions were more pessimistic was not quite 
significant at the 5% level.  Payroll forecast errors, on the other hand, were significantly greater 
than zero for both processes, but the auction and consensus estimates were both equally 
optimistic. 
VI. Improvement over Time 
The final question to be addressed is whether auction participants “learn” from prior 
auctions with the result that, over time, the auction forecasts do a better job of predicting the 
announcements.  To address this question, I first examined a plot of the auction forecast errors 
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against a chronological ordering of the auctions (shown below in Figure 3) to determine if there 
was a pattern over time.6 
Figure 3: Time series plot of auction forecast errors 
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If the forecasts are becoming more accurate over time, there should be a reduction in the 
variance in auction forecast errors for later auctions.  To test whether this is the case, I divided 
the auctions into two groups – the earlier half and the later half – and conducted a variance ratio 
test to determine whether the two groups exhibit non-constant variance.  The F-statistic for this 
test is 2.307 with a tail probability of 0.047, suggesting that the variance may be decreasing over 
time.  To determine whether this result holds for auction forecasts of all three economic 
measures, I repeated the test for ISM auctions, Nonfarm Payroll auctions, and Retail Sales 
                                                 
6 Note that, for the seven Nonfarm payroll announcements with two associated auctions, I used only the earlier of 
the two auctions in this analysis, as the earlier auction forecasts are more directly comparable with the 
announcements for which there was only one auction. 
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auctions separately.  It appears that the overall reduction in variance is driven solely by a 
reduction in the variance of Retail Sales forecast errors. 
To further analyze the improvement over time, I conducted a regression to see whether 
the absolute value of the standardized auction forecast error is related to the chronological 
auction number, using the equation tError t ×+= βα)( , where t = the chronological auction 
number.  This analysis was conducted for the combined sample and for each of the individual 
types of announcements.  The regressions were not significant for the combined sample or for 
the ISM and Nonfarm Payroll auctions, yielding F-statistics ranging from 0.03 to 0.61 (with 
associated tail probabilities of 0.87 to 0.44).  Once again, however, Retail Sales auctions did 
demonstrate improvement.  The regression for Retail Sales provided the results summarized in 
Table 4, below.  For Retail Sales, it appears that each new auction is associated with a reduction 
in the absolute value of the forecast error of about 0.05 standard deviations.   
Table 4: Regression of Retail Sales Absolute Forecast Errors vs Auction Number 
 Coefficient 
Standard Error 
of Coefficient T-Statistic Tail Probability 
Constant 1.05 0.19 5.53 0.00 
Auction Number  -0.05 0.02 -2.59 0.02 
Adjusted R2 = 27.7%, F-statistic = 6.73 with tail probability of 0.021 
It is unclear why Retail Sales would be the only economic measure with a demonstrated 
improvement in auction forecast errors over time.  It is not the least volatile of the measures 
under consideration here – ISM manufacturing announcements exhibit a much smaller standard 
deviation relative to its mean.  There also does not appear to have been a predictable trend in the 
Retail Sales announcements over the period in question that might explain the improvements.   
Perhaps the improvement in Retail Sales forecasts over time is related to its position in 
the monthly cycle of data releases.  In a study of the impact of macroeconomic announcements 
on foreign exchange markets, Andersen et al (2003) found that releases which occur earlier in the 
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month tend to have a greater impact on markets than those that occur later in the month, 
presumably because later releases contain little “new” information.  In keeping with those 
findings, we might expect to see auctions for Retail Sales releases, which take place later in the 
month, generate more accurate predictions than those for Nonfarm Payrolls, which take place 
about a week earlier, and for the ISM index, which typically occurs the first or second day of the 
month.  Notwithstanding the improvement in Retail Sales predictions over time, however, this 
does not appear to be the case.  As noted in section III, above, ISM auctions generated the 
smallest mean absolute errors (0.21), followed by Retail Sales auctions (0.62) and, finally, by 
Nonfarm Payrolls (0.76).  A likely explanation for this unexpected result might be the impact of 
the so-called “jobless recovery” coming out of the 2001 recession.  Nonfarm Payroll auction 
participants may have made overly optimistic predictions after receiving good news about the 
expanding economy.   
VII. Conclusion 
The analysis in this paper showed that, on average, the implied market forecasts from the 
auctions were not significantly different than economists’ consensus forecasts, and the auction 
predictions did not embody expertise in judging the surprise in the forthcoming announcement.  
However, the data do seem to support a finding that the auctions produce less overly optimistic 
forecasts than economist consensus estimates.  It appears that market participants are more 
cautious when money is at risk than economists are when their reputation is at risk.  Finally, with 
the possible exception of Retail Sales announcements, the accuracy of the auction forecasts does 
not appear to have improved with time.   
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Appendix I – Sample Post Auction Reports 
 
 
(a) Post Auction Report. Change in US Non-farm Payrolls, November 2002 Report 
 
The first graph shows implied probabilities that are fairly symmetric based on opening 
prices. The second graph shows the evolution of the implied market forecast over the 
auction period with a sharp change in the implied forecast around 3:00 PM. The third 
graph shows the revised implied probabilities based on the closing option prices.  
 
 
(b) Post Auction Report. ISM Manufacturing PMI, November 2003 
 
The first graph shows implied probabilities based on opening prices. Note the symmetry 
in the graph and upturn for extreme high and low values. The second graph shows the 
revised implied probabilities based on closing option prices. These revised probabilities 
differ considerably from the first graph.  
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Appendix II – Data 
Event Release Period Release Date Auction Date
Auction Implied 
Market Forecast
Economist 
Consensus 
Forecast
Actual 
Announcement
ISM Oct-02 11/1/2002 10/31/2002 47.5 48.9 48.5
ISM Nov-02 12/2/2002 12/2/2002 51 51 49.2
ISM Jan-03 2/3/2003 1/31/2003 53.2 54 53.9
ISM Feb-03 3/3/2003 2/28/2003 52.2 52 50.5
ISM Mar-03 4/1/2003 3/31/2003 48.1 49 46.2
ISM Apr-03 5/1/2003 4/30/2003 47 47.2 45.4
ISM May-03 6/2/2003 5/30/2003 48.4 48.65 49.4
ISM Jun-03 7/1/2003 7/1/2003 51.2 51 49.8
ISM Jul-03 8/1/2003 7/31/2003 51.8 52 51.8
ISM Aug-03 9/2/2003 9/2/2003 54.4 54 54.7
ISM Sep-03 10/1/2003 10/1/2003 53.4 54.5 53.7
ISM Oct-03 11/3/2003 11/2/2003 56.2 56 57
ISM Nov-03 12/1/2003 12/1/2003 58.4 58.5 62.8
ISM Jan-04 2/2/2004 2/2/2004 64.6 64 63.6
ISM Feb-04 3/1/2004 3/1/2004 61.1 62 61.4
Retail Sales Oct-02 11/14/2002 11/13/2002 0.01 0.30 0.70
Retail Sales Nov-02 12/12/2002 12/11/2002 0.13 0.20 0.50
Retail Sales Dec-02 1/14/2003 1/13/2003 0.23 0.30 0.00
Retail Sales Jan-03 2/13/2003 2/12/2003 0.53 0.50 1.30
Retail Sales Feb-03 3/13/2003 3/12/2003 -0.21 -0.10 -1.00
Retail Sales Mar-03 4/11/2003 4/10/2003 0.41 0.40 1.10
Retail Sales Apr-03 5/14/2003 5/13/2003 -0.14 0.20 -0.90
Retail Sales May-03 6/12/2003 6/11/2003 0.17 0.20 0.10
Retail Sales Jun-03 7/15/2003 7/14/2003 0.16 0.30 0.70
Retail Sales Jul-03 8/13/2003 8/12/2003 0.63 0.60 0.80
Retail Sales Aug-03 9/12/2003 9/12/2003 0.82 0.80 0.70
Retail Sales Sep-03 10/15/2003 10/15/2003 0.57 0.40 0.30
Retail Sales Oct-03 11/14/2003 11/14/2003 0.09 0.20 0.20
Retail Sales Nov-03 12/11/2003 12/11/2003 0.32 0.30 0.40
Retail Sales Dec-03 1/15/2004 1/15/2004 0.41 0.40 0.10
Retail Sales Jan-04 2/12/2004 2/12/2004 0.6 0.50 0.90
Nonfarm Payroll Sep-02 10/4/2002 10/1/2002 -38 6 -43
Nonfarm Payroll Sep-02 10/4/2002 10/3/2002 -18 6 -43
Nonfarm Payroll Oct-02 11/1/2002 10/29/2002 -16 0 -5
Nonfarm Payroll Oct-02 11/1/2003 10/31/2002 -13 0 -5
Nonfarm Payroll Nov-02 12/6/2002 12/5/2002 70 35.5 -40
Nonfarm Payroll Dec-02 1/10/2003 1/9/2003 36 20 -101
Nonfarm Payroll Jan-03 2/7/2003 2/6/2003 59 68 143
Nonfarm Payroll Feb-03 3/7/2003 3/6/2003 -13 10 -308
Nonfarm Payroll Mar-03 4/3/2003 4/3/2003 -65 -35 -108
Nonfarm Payroll Apr-03 5/2/2003 5/1/2003 -119 -60 -48
Nonfarm Payroll May-03 6/6/2003 6/5/2003 -44 -30 -17
Nonfarm Payroll Jun-03 7/3/2003 7/2/2003 4 0 -30
Nonfarm Payroll Jul-03 8/1/2003 7/31/2003 17 10 -44
Nonfarm Payroll Aug-03 9/5/2003 9/4/2003 7 20 -93
Nonfarm Payroll Sep-03 10/3/2003 10/3/2003 -3 -25 57
Nonfarm Payroll Sep-03 10/3/2003 10/2/2003 -11 -25 57
Nonfarm Payroll Oct-03 11/7/2003 11/6/2003 86 65 126
Nonfarm Payroll Oct-03 11/7/2003 11/7/2003 88 65 126
Nonfarm Payroll Nov-03 12/5/2003 12/4/2003 151 150 57
Nonfarm Payroll Nov-03 12/5/2003 12/5/2003 160 150 57
Nonfarm Payroll Dec-03 1/9/2004 1/8/2004 181 150 1
Nonfarm Payroll Dec-03 1/9/2004 1/9/2004 162 150 1
Nonfarm Payroll Jan-04 2/6/2004 2/5/2004 167 175 112
Nonfarm Payroll Jan-04 2/6/2004 2/6/2004 174 175 112
Nonfarm Payroll Feb-04 3/6/2004 3/6/2004 130 130 21  
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I. INTRODUCTION
 
The headline of the Wall Street Journal on July 9, 2003 “German Convertible Deal Is 
Biggest Issue Offer Ever” should not be misinterpreted in the assessment of the European capital 
markets. Despite this €5.0 billion exchangeable-bond offering that can be switched into shares of 
Deutsche Telekom, Europe is still dominated by bank financing – a model with a very 
questionable future. 
This research report will analyze the indispensable migration from the dedicated capital 
system to the Anglo-American fluid capital system. Although this process will take place in most 
continental European economies, the analysis is focused on Germany. There are mainly two 
reasons that support this decision: First, the success or the failure of the migration in Germany – 
as Europe’s largest economy – will have a major impact on the developments on the whole 
continent. Second, Germany is the European country that is lagging behind the most and that has 
to undergo the most radical structural reforms in order to satisfy the changing financing needs of 
its economy. One instance of this is that corporate debt securities in Germany only make up for 
4% of the GDP while this ratio amounts to 22%, 27%, and 29% in France, the UK, and the US, 
respectively.7 
The first of the report's four parts is dedicated to the historical assessment and the 
development of the traditional bank-corporate relationships.  
The historical discussion in the first part provides the background for the analysis of the 
pressures for systemic change in the second part. 
                                                 
7 Lehman Brothers European Research. 2003. 
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Part three of the report makes use of quantitative data in order examine the current and 
the expected development of the instruments on the German capital market.  
The last part describes the anticipated transformation of intermediaries and corporations 
as well as the (re-)action of the regulatory bodies. 
 
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON GERMANY'S BANKING MODEL 
 In order to put the German banking model into a global perspective, it is important to 
have a look at the two different capital markets models that are available. On the left side of 
Exhibit 1, the fluid capital system is described that is mostly used in Anglo-American countries 
and that is characterized by highly mobile capital and a transaction driven environment.8 
Conversely, the dedicated capital system that is shown on the right side has relatively immobile 
capital and permanent owners as its main feature.  
Exhibit 1: The Battle of the Systems9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 Walter, Ingo. European Economic Transition, Capital Markets and Investment Banking Competition. 2004. 
9 Walter, Ingo. European Economic Transition, Capital Markets and Investment Banking Competition. 2004. 
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 A result of the history of continental Europe, the dedicated capital system has significant 
drawbacks in the globalizing world. Therefore, in order to keep up with global competition and 
the requisites of more rapid growth, the continental European markets are migrating towards the 
fluid capital system. Among the developed European countries, Germany lags far behind in this 
migration process and will therefore have to undergo the most significant changes in the next 
future in order to keep its economy competitive. 
 The special position of the German capital market is also a result of its corporate control 
structure that is known as the "bank-based system". The respective control linkages of this 
structure are shown in Exhibit 2: 
Exhibit 2: Control Linkages in the Bank-Based System10 
 
 
 
 
 In this system, the banks play a central 'coordinating' role as they influence the direction 
of the economy in multiple ways such as in debt and equity financing as well as in corporate 
control through voting rights and boardroom participation.11 
 First, German corporations cannot rely on a well developed bond market for their 
financing needs. Therefore, debt financing through banks is of high importance. One instance of 
this is that in Germany corporate loans currently amount to about 121% of GDP while corporate 
                                                 
10 Walter, Ingo. European Economic Transition, Capital Markets and Investment Banking Competition. 2004. 
11 Traditionally, German banks are "universal" banks providing both commercial and investment banking services. 
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debt securities only make up for 4% of GDP. In order to mitigate the liquidity risk that results 
from the difficult access to the fluid capital markets, German corporations maintain a long-
standing relationship to one bank ('Hausbank') on which they can rely even in difficult times and 
with which they run the core of their banking business.12 
 Second, in this system, banks and their investment companies hold large equity stakes in 
non-financial companies. Due to the underdeveloped German equity market those shareholdings 
are extremely high in the international context. For example, there is a majority shareholder for 
57% of listed German companies while this percentage amounts only to 6% for listed UK 
companies.13 The importance of financial institutions in German equity investing can also be 
seen in some of the investments that Allianz, the financial services conglomerate, still held in 
2000: Beiersdorf 38.4%, Munich Re 33.3%, Karstadt 16.5%, E.ON 12.1%, BASF 11.3%, and 
RWE 11.2%.14 
 Third, in addition to the direct debt and equity stakes, German banks do influence the 
corporate sector through delegated voting rights ('Depotstimmrecht') and interlocked directorates 
in the supervisory boards. These important links with their clients give the banks the monitoring 
rights and (inside) information they need to provide long-term financing.15 However, this private 
information creates reluctance of 'outsiders' to invest in corporate bonds and shares and it thereby 
slows down the development of strong capital markets. 
  
                                                 
12 Quack, Sigrid / Hildebrandt, Swen. 1995. Hausbank or Fournisseur. 
13 Franks, Julian / Mayer, Colin. 2001. Ownership and Control of German Corporations, p. 947: Sample of the 171 
and 173 largest German and UK listed companies, respectively. 
14 Allianz AG. 2003. Staying the Course. For an extensive list and the current shareholdings refer to the Appendix. 
15 Quack, Sigrid / Hildebrandt, Swen. 1995. Hausbank or Fournisseur, p. 6; Walter, Ingo / Smith, Roy C. 2000. High 
Finance in the EURO-Zone, p. 201. 
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 This part has provided the historical perspective of the German banking and capital 
market and has already shown some of the problematic areas of the system. In the next part, the 
pressures for the migration from the dedicated capital system to the fluid capital system will be 
analyzed. 
 
III. PRESSURES FOR SYSTEMIC CHANGE IN THE MIGRATION 
PROCESS 
 The current market environment puts immense pressure on the German banking and 
capital markets for an expeditious migration to the fluid capital system. This migration process 
will be indispensable in order to maintain the competitiveness of Germany's financial and non-
financial institutions. The pressures result from legal and institutional changes as well as from 
changes in the competitive environment.  
 
III.1 Competitive pressures facing non-financial firms and the cost of capital 
 With hourly costs of labor that are 13% higher than in the U.S. and 43% higher than in 
Britain Germany has been relying heavily on its productivity and its innovation.16 However, 
those advantages have almost disappeared over the last couple of years. Nowadays, the economy 
is burdened with a very inflexible labor market and over-regulation. In addition to that, German 
companies are facing the restrictive credit policies of their formerly generous Hausbanks. 
 In this market environment, German corporations are turning to corporate finance in an 
effort to uncover potential efficiency gains in order to maintain their competitiveness. In effect, 
this process can be described as a move to the right on the firm continuum that is shown in 
                                                 
16 The Economist. 2002. Is Deutschland AG kaputt? 
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Exhibit 3. Thereby, they are taking advantage of capital markets products that represent more 
effective solutions in terms of WACC optimization. 
Exhibit 3: The Firm Continuum17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III.2 High risk, low reward – the dilemma of German banks 
 The crisis of the German banking system is exemplified by the recent discussions of the 
German government with the banks to create a "bad bank".18 With corporate bankruptcies and 
bad-debt provisions at record levels, this creation was intended to help banks offloading their 
non-performing loans and returning them into a stable financial position. Finally, the idea of the 
bad bank has been rejected in order not to admit a crisis.  
                                                 
17 Walter, Ingo. European Economic Transition, Capital Markets and Investment Banking Competition. 2004. 
18 The Economist. 2003. Shuffling the pack. 
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 However, the problem of the German banks does not primarily result from the current 
economic downturn but from structural reasons. The coexistence of private banks with public-
sector banks that obtain cheap refinancing through state guarantees has held interest margins 
even for medium-sized companies consistently below 1%.19 Thereby, the profitability has been 
squeezed out of the system. This marginal profitability is further diminished by having the 
luxury of 50,000 branch offices in Germany – far more than anywhere else in Europe.20 
 In order to position themselves effectively in the expected consolidation process, German 
banks need to diversify away from the risk-loaded lending to the fee-based capital markets 
businesses. This has been the approach of the Anglo-American banks that is described in the next 
paragraph. 
 
III.3 Penetration of Anglo-American intermediaries 
 "[German banks'] migration in corporate advisory to capital markets products such as 
equity or bond issuance has been sluggish. This gap was filled with might and main by foreign 
financial institutions."21 This quote by Rolf E. Breuer, Chairman of Deutsche Bank, reflects the 
current market sentiment among German banks that are still focused on the high-risk, low reward 
corporate lending. 
In order to analyze the accuracy of this perception of the changing market structure and 
the penetration of the Anglo-American intermediaries on the German market, the SDC 
Platinum22 database was used. It provides issuance and M&A data for the last 20 years and gives 
                                                 
19 The Economist. 2002. This is tomorrow calling. Financial Times. 2004. Das Kapital - Allianz: The average 
interest margin in Germany has risen by 25 basis points in 2003 – "a sign that the banking sector starts to act more 
rationally".  
20 Der Spiegel. 2002.Kassieren und abhauen. 
21 Der Spiegel. 2002. "Alle haben Fehler gemacht". 
22 SDC Platinum is a product of the Thomson Corporation. 
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the possibility to create league tables in order to analyze the market penetration of domestic and 
foreign banks. An important caveat for this analysis is that a detailed disclosure of issuance data 
and investment banking fees has just been initiated gradually over the last 20 years. However, 
the reliability of the available data can be assumed since crosschecks with other, less detailed 
databases have led to no significant deviations. 
 The analysis is split-up into IPOs, secondaries, debt and M&A. In order to analyze 
changes over time, each area is divided into five 4-year brackets for which the number of 
issues/transactions, the principal/transaction value and the top three underwriters/advisors are 
analyzed.  
 
 As the following table shows, the German IPO market until recently has been dominated 
by the major German banks that have had long-standing relationships with the issuers. In recent 
years, however, more and more Anglo-American firms such as Goldman Sachs have obtained 
important roles in that market. The most probable explanation for this development seems to be 
the relationships and the placing power that they have built in Germany and the rest of Europe 
over the last years. 
Table 1: Development of the German IPO Market 
 
1984 - 1987 1988 - 1991 1992 - 1995 1996 - 1999 2000 - 2003
# of Issues 1 23 37 298 235
Principal amount $201.1m $3,205.2m $3,205.0m $17,378.6m $12,433.0m
Top 3 Advisors Deutsche Bank Deutsche Bank Commerzbank DKW Goldman Sachs
-- DKW Deutsche Bank Goldman Sachs Deutsche Bank
-- DZ Bank Goldman Sachs Deutsche Bank DKW  
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Table 2 shows the secondary issues that were separated from the primary offering 
because it could be expected that the major underwriters change significantly. This is because the 
secondary market is characterized by bigger, more mature issuers that might have better 
relationships with the global banks. The analysis, however, has shown that also in this area 
Anglo-American investment banks do not play a significant role to date.  
Table 2: Development of the German Secondary Market 
 
1984 - 1987 1988 - 1991 1992 - 1995 1996 - 1999 2000 - 2003
# of Issues 12 74 273 143 118
Principal amount $759.1m $5,619.1m $28,524.2m $35,940.7m $25,034.3m
Top 3 Advisors Deutsche Bank Deutsche Bank Deutsche Bank Deutsche Bank Deutsche Bank
ING DKW DKW DKW Goldman Sachs
DKW WestLB WestLB WestLB DKW  
  
 For the corporate debt markets, the SDC database does not provide enough historical data 
to assess the trend of Anglo-American underwriters on the German bond market. In general, 
however, this market is still dominated by the German private banks and the Landesbanken. One 
of the major reasons for this is that the German debt market mainly consists of issuances from 
the government (48%) and from financial institutions (47%) where domestic institutions usually 
play the key underwriting roles.23 This fact – in combination with longstanding 'Hausbank'-
relationships – gives the domestic banks a strong marketing tool in attracting the debt business 
from corporates. 
 With their international distribution power and their increased coverage, Anglo-American 
intermediaries will be able to play a more important role in German debt underwriting in the 
years to come.  
                                                 
23 Bank for International Settlements. 2003. BIS Quarterly Review.. 
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 Although the analysis of the German M&A activity is only remotely related to the 
financing theme it shows a strategically important area for Anglo-American intermediaries to 
enter the German market. Through their dominance in German M&A they should develop more 
and more relationships that help them improve their position as underwriters. 
Table 3: Development of the German M&A Market 
 
1984 - 1987 1988 - 1991 1992 - 1995 1996 - 1999 2000 - 2003
# of Transactions 15 66 72 205 201
Transaction Value $6,164.4m $34,208.3m $41,518.4m $266,282.0m $237,913.1m
Top 3 Advisors Morgan Stanley UBS CSFB Goldman Sachs Deutsche Bank
CSFB Morgan Stanley JP Morgan Deutsche Bank Morgan Stanley
UBS Lehman Brothers Deutsche Bank Morgan Stanley JP Morgan  
  
 In summary the penetration of Anglo-American banks is not as big as the market 
sentiment has expected. However, due to their good distribution and their focused client 
coverage, they are gaining momentum. In addition to that, their profitability is still much higher 
than that of the domestic banks since the former can concentrate on the fee business leaving 
corporate lending to the domestic players. 
 
III.4 Capital adequacy rules Basle II 
 While in other developed countries bank credits make up for 30% of corporate capital 
needs, German companies rely to 70% on banks.24 These numbers show how important the 
banks' credit approval practices are for the German economy. Therefore, the new capital 
                                                 
24 Jenkins, Patrick. 2004. Mezzanine hits the Mittelstand. 
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adequacy requirements "Basel II" that will enter into force in December 2006 will have a big 
impact. 
 The main goal of Basel II is to link banks' capital requirements more closely than in the 
past to the actual economic risk which they face.25 In order to operate profitably under the new 
rules, banks will become more structured in assessing the credit risk of their borrowers. While 
this appears to be a rational approach, it conflicts somewhat with the Hausbank system. There, 
loan commitments are rather based on the bank-customer relationship than on risk-adjusted 
pricing. 
 In the assessment of the consequences of Basel II, the undercapitalization of German 
corporations is another important factor. This is especially relevant for Germany's "Mittelstand", 
the medium-sized, mainly owner-run firms that make up the bulk of the economy. On average, 
they have a debt-to-equity ratio of 5.0 compared to 2.2 for the same segment in the U.S.26 Since 
Basel II obliges banks to weigh this ratio with 15% in their credit risk measurement systems, 
German corporations will be at a major disadvantage in the international context.  
 As most banks have started to implement the new rules, the first results for German 
corporations can already be seen. As a survey of the Ifo-Institute, for example, has shown 
German banks have become more restrictive in granting loans and the credit terms have become 
less favorable.27 This result provides an additional incentive for German corporations to turn to 
the capital markets to increase their capital base and to optimize their cost of capital. 
 
                                                 
25 Deutsche Bundesbank. 2004. Basel II – the new Capital Accord. 
26 The Economist. 2003. Without credit. 
27 N-TV. 2003. Banken verweigern Kredite. 
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III.5 Public-sector intermediaries – abolition of the state guarantees 
 With a market share of 34% of all bank loans to companies, German savings banks have 
a very important position in financing the economy.28 These savings banks do not operate as 
isolated entities but form a network with other group members and centralized refinancing 
institutions – the so-called Landesbanken.29 The refinancing costs of these Landesbanken that 
enjoy top credit ratings are extremely low since the state guarantees to bail out potentially ailing 
institutions.  
 These guarantees, however, have been forbidden by the European Commission and will 
be abolished by July 2005. According to Standard & Poor's, this abolition will shift all but three 
of the eleven Landesbanken into BBB credit-rating territory.30 Considering the expected annual 
increase in refinancing costs of €4-5 billion,31 this would render unworkable the Landesbanks' 
current business model that is based on borrowing cheaply in international markets.  
 The effect of this change on German corporate finance will be that the Landesbanken will 
not be able to lend as cheaply as before. In consequence, the affected corporations trying to 
minimize their WACC will have to turn to the capital market in order to stay financially 
competitive. 
 
III.6 The growth of the institutional investor pools 
 Historically, Germany has been lagging behind in the market capitalization of its equity 
markets (please refer to IV.3). Furthermore, the development of significant institutional investor 
                                                 
28 Quack, Sigrid / Hildebrandt, Swen. 1995. Hausbank or Fournisseur, p. 11. 
29 Quack, Sigrid / Hildebrandt, Swen. 1995. Hausbank or Fournisseur, p. 13. 
30 Jenkins, Patrick. 2003. German banks disclose merger talks. 
31 A.T. Kearney in WirtschaftWoche. 2004. Kinder der Sparkassen, p. 58. 
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pools has been hindered by the system of very conservative investors and an unfunded pension 
system that did to promote investing in the capital markets.  
 However, driven by the Deutsche Telekom IPO in 1996, Germans have become aware of 
the benefits (and some of the drawbacks) of capital markets investing. In combination with the 
growing unreliability of the public pension system, this has promoted the growth of the 
institutional investor pools.  
 Table 4 and Exhibit 4 show the sustainable trend in the growth of institutional demand 
for capital market investments in Germany. One instance of this is, that even in difficult years 
like 2001 and 2002, there is a massive inflow, i.e. increase in # of share certificates, into German 
investment funds.  
Table 4: Growth of the Institutional Investor Pool32 
 
# of Funds %-Change
Number of share 
certificates %-Change
Aggregated fund 
volume %-Change
(in millions) (in EUR millions)
1995 3,233 6,648.9 288,852.3
1996 3,610 11.7% 7,374.6 10.9% 349,737.5 21.1%
1997 4,240 17.5% 8,684.3 17.8% 460,317.1 31.6%
1998 5,050 19.1% 10,365.6 19.4% 579,102.0 25.8%
1999 5,757 14.0% 12,036.3 16.1% 766,082.0 32.3%
2000 6,447 12.0% 13,250.2 10.1% 821,211.0 7.2%
2001 6,825 5.9% 14,429.8 8.9% 813,292.0 -1.0%
2002 6,696 -1.9% 15,366.5 6.5% 762,698.0 -6.2%
2003 6,592 -1.6% 16,158.3 5.2% 836,717.0 9.7%  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32 Deutsche Bundesbank. 2003. Kapitalmarktstatistik. 
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Exhibit 4: Growth of the Institutional Investor Pool33 
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III.7 The launch of the Euro 
 As previously described, German corporations are struggling with the ailing banking 
system and the underdeveloped capital markets. In this context, the launch of the Euro in 1999 
has provided major opportunities to satisfy their financing needs on a bigger, more integrated 
European market for capital. 
 In the bond markets the effect of the Euro has been the most prominent. It has increased 
the attractiveness of market-based financing methods by allowing debt issuers to tap institutional 
                                                 
33 Deutsche Bundesbank. 2003. Kapitalmarktstatistik. 
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portfolios across and beyond the euro area.34 One instance of this is the threefold increase in the 
issuance of bonds denominated in Euro whose timing coincided exactly with the new currency's 
debut in 1999.35 This trend is expected to continue as corporations will replace their maturing 
bank borrowings with capital market financings. The Bank for International Settlements even 
expects that about one third of all corporate bank loans will eventually be switched into debt 
securities. This would generate inflows into the corporate bond markets of about $2,000 billion.36 
 In the equity markets, the main effect of the Euro has been that investors now focus more 
on sectors than on countries. Furthermore, their investment universe comprises the whole Euro 
area instead of just their national market.37 Therefore, German corporations have to compete for 
capital with their European peers from the same sector rather than with other domestic firms. 
 Considering the underdeveloped domestic capital markets, German corporations do 
benefit from the Euro and the resulting increase in the investor pools. However, they will also 
have to be aware of the more international competition for funds. 
 
IV. DEVELOPMENT OF THE INSTRUMENTS ON THE GERMAN 
CAPITAL MARKET 
 
IV.1 The toolkit of external finance: Hypotheses on external finance migration 
 Part one and two have analyzed the history of the German banking model and the 
pressures that are working against the current system. These analyses imply that German banks 
                                                 
34 Galati, Gabriele / Tsatsaronis, Kostas. 2001. The impact of the Euro on Europe's financial markets, p. 1. 
35 Galati, Gabriele / Tsatsaronis, Kostas. 2001. The impact of the Euro on Europe's financial markets, p. 11. It should 
be noted that 1999 was the peak of bond issuance in the telecoms sector. As a result of this, the increased issuance 
cannot solely be attributed to the new currency. 
36 Schatz, Eric et al. 1997. European monetary union and international capital markets. 
37 Smith, Roy C. / Walter, Ingo. 2003. Global Banking, p. 179. 
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and corporations need to give up their dedicated capital system and migrate towards the fluid 
capital system in order to stay competitive. 
 The existence and the current stage of this migration process can best be assessed by 
analyzing the development of the different financing alternatives, as the 'toolkit' of external 
finance. In this analysis we would suspect to find the trends that are shown in Table 5 and that 
are examined subsequently. 
Table 5: Expected Development of External Finance Products 
 
Product area Expectation
Bank lending ▼
Debt securities (amount outstanding) ▲
Equity securities (market capitalization) ▲
Alternative funding sources ▲
Investor pools ▲
Share ownership of financial institutions ▼  
  
IV.2 Debt financing – bank lending vs. corporate bonds 
 In Germany, banks still provide corporate loans that amount to 121% of GDP.38 
Conversely, corporate debt securities only make up for 4% of GDP while this ratio amounts to 
22%, 27%, and 29% in France, the U.K., and the U.S., respectively.39 In part two, we have 
described the various legal and competitive constraints that are opposed to the retention of the 
current way of debt financing in Germany. In our analysis of the actual market data, we would 
therefore expect a significant shift from bank lending to debt securities.  
 
 
                                                 
38 Deutsche Bundesbank. 2004. Bankenstatistik. 
39 Lehman Brothers European Research. 2003. 
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IV.2.1 Bank Lending 
Exhibit 5 shows the development of bank lending in Germany in the last decade: 
Exhibit 5: Bank Lending in Germany40 
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As the external pressures are relatively new or will enter into force over the course of the 
next few years, the most important parts of this graph are the years from 2000 to 2003. There, a 
substantial reduction of the growth or even a decrease in the total amount can be observed. This 
phenomenon is an important sign for the starting migration away from bank lending to capital 
markets-based financing. Although one of the drivers of this development is the cyclical 
economic downturn, the most important reasons for this development are structural.  
                                                 
40 Deutsche Bundesbank. 2002. Monatsbericht; Deutsche Bundesbank. 2004. Bankenstatistik. 
 43
 Taking into account all the forces that promote a shift away from bank financing a more 
important decrease could have been expected. Even by calculating the ratio of bank lending to 
economic activity (GDP), the result shows an only slightly decreasing importance of the bank 
lending for German corporations.41 
 
IV.2.2 Outstanding Debt Securities 
 The gathering of the historical data for the amount of outstanding debt securities in the 
German market has proven to be difficult. The Deutsche Bundesbank for example does only 
provide corporates-specific data on fixed-rate debt securities. The total amounts could only be 
found at the Bank of International Settlements which has started to publish a breakdown into 
corporates and financial institutions in 1998. 
 The available data (see Exhibit 6) shows a significant increase of outstanding debt 
securities over the last couple of years. One of the major reasons for this increase has been the 
favorable interest rate environment in the debt markets. However, more importantly, this trend 
has been driven by the starting penetration of Anglo-American intermediaries and from the 
restrictive stance of German banks towards bank lending.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
41 See Table A1 in the Appendix for the complete data table. 
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Exhibit 6: Outstanding Debt Securities42 
 
Amounts Outstanding of German Corporate Debt 
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 Although the total amount of outstanding debt securities is still only 3% of the bank 
loans, the migration of debt financing from bank lending towards the capital markets can be 
recognized.  
 
IV.3 The German equity market 
 With a capitalization that amounts to 54% of GDP the German equity market lags far 
behind other developed markets such as the U.S. (136%) or the U.K. (67%). The same 
relationship holds true when we look at the total number of domestic firms listed on German 
exchanges – 793 compared to 4,793 and 2,311 in the U.S. and in the U.K., respectively.43 
However, the development during the boom of the late 1990s has shown the potential in the 
German equity market that is shown in Exhibit 7. 
                                                 
42 Deutsche Bundesbank. 2004. Kapitalmarktstatistik; Bank for International Settlements. 2003. BIS Quarterly 
Review. 
43 World Federation of Exchanges. 2003. Newsletter and Statistics. 
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Exhibit 7: Market Capitalization of German Equities44 
 
Market Capitalization of German Equities
0
500,000
1,000,000
1,500,000
2,000,000
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
-60.0%
-40.0%
-20.0%
0.0%
20.0%
40.0%
60.0%
80.0%
Market Capitalization in EUR Millions
%-Change in Market Capitalization
 
 
 Currently, the main concern of Deutsche Börse is to restore the trust of the investors into 
the capital markets that was lost through the failure of its small cap and new technology segment 
"Neuer Markt". In a first attempt to do that, the major German exchange has introduced two new 
market segments Prime Standard and General Standard that are characterized by much improved 
transparency and disclosure requirements.45 
 It remains to be seen if this measurement leads to the much needed trading liquidity for 
mid-caps and if it opens up the window for a meaningful stream of IPOs. In March 2004, the 
market sentiment at least seems to be positive and investors are looking forward to the first IPOs 
since 2002. With a strong pipeline of IPO candidates, such as Postbank, and significant inflows 
into mutual funds, demand seems to find supply again on the German equity market. 
 
                                                 
44 Deutsche Bundesbank. 2003. Kapitalmarktstatistik. 
45 World Federation of Exchanges. 2003. Newsletter and Statistics. 
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IV.4 Alternative funding sources 
In addition to their migration to bonds and equity instruments, German corporations do 
adopt innovative financing techniques to satisfy their capital needs. The most important 
developments in that context take place in the securitization, the private equity and the 
mezzanine market. 
 With €6.0 billion of issuance in 2003, German securitization activity was far lower than 
in most other European countries (e.g., Portugal with €10.1 billion). However, since 
securitization could help German banks as well as domestic corporations to free-up some capital 
it is in the interest of the German economy to build a meaningful market in this area. Therefore, 
important projects have been initiated that feed the hopes for high growth as shown in Exhibit 8. 
 On the one hand, most German securitizations to date have been constructed 
synthetically, using credit derivatives to avoid corporation tax. In mid-2003, however, the 
German legislator has changed the tax law to support securitizations that are "true sales" of 
assets. On the other hand, twelve major banks46 have created a joint venture with KfW, the state-
owned development bank, which will securitize and sell significant amounts of their loans. In 
2004, this initiative is expected to issue Collateralized Loan Obligations (CLOs) of around €10 – 
11 billion.47 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
46 Among those banks are Commerzbank, Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, DZ Bank, and HypoVereinsbank. As the 
only non-German member, Citigroup is part of the joint venture. 
47 The Economist. 2003. Shuffling the pack. 
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Exhibit 8: Securitization in Germany48 
 
 
 In private equity, the restructuring needs of the German economy and the 
undercapitalization of the corporations provide entry opportunities for investors. The market 
appears to be divided between German investors focusing on small and medium-sized 
transactions and Anglo-American investors taking the lead in large buyouts. Overall, Germany 
has seen an increase in private equity activity from 59 deals with a transaction value of €6.3 
billion in 2002 to 70 deals (€11.6 billion) in 2003. Despite this increase, the main struggle of the 
financial sponsors is the limited exit opportunities due to the dry IPO market. However, as this 
market appears to improve, the situation is expected to change in 2004.49 
 With € 6.9 billion of European mezzanine invested in the 12 months ending in June 2003 
(€5.1 billion in the previous year), this financing technique is still in the early stage of its 
                                                 
48 Bachmann, Reto et al. 2004. European Structured Products Outlook 2004. 
49 Ernst & Young. 2004. German Private Equity Activity 2002/2003. 
2003A in EUR millions
Total Volume: EUR 6.0 billion
ABS
1,800, 30.0%
CMBS
840, 14.0%
RMBS
1,320, 22.0%CLO
2,040, 34.0%
2004E in EUR millions
Total Volume: EUR 21.0 billion
ABS
2,000, 9.5%
CMBS
2,000, 9.5%
RMBS
5,000, 23.8%
CLO
12,000, 57.1%
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development.50 However, the growth perspectives for mezzanine appear to be advantageous in 
the German market. This is because mezzanine improves the company's credit rating while 
maintaining the ownership structure – a feature that is especially important for the German 
Mittelstand. These prospects explain the eagerness of German banks such as NordLB and 
SachsenLB to enter into this market and help their clients to organize their financing structure 
more efficiently.51 
 
IV.5 Share ownership of financial institutions 
 In Parts one and two, we have shown that German financial institutions dispose of a high 
amount of non-core shareholdings and that they are struggling with their profitability and 
capitalization. Given that there is a growing investor pool that provides the demand for the 
securities and that most corporate divestments are tax-exempt since 2002, we would expect the 
institutions to reduce their investments significantly. 
 In fact, this sell-off of non-core shareholdings can be identified at most of the major 
financial institutions. One instance of this is Deutsche Bank which reduced its unrealized gains 
in its investment portfolio from €20 billion in 1998 to € 2 billion in 2003. €12 billion of this 
reduction directly resulted from the sale of its industrial holdings.52 
 Allianz is another example which is openly promoting its intention to unwind its cross-
shareholdings and to sell their non-core investments. As the Table A2 in the Appendix shows, 
Allianz has been very active in this process over the last few years. Since 2000, it has sold €25 
billion of its shareholdings.53 
                                                 
50 Initiative Europe. 2003. Mezzanine Monitor – Second Quarter 2003. 
51 Jenkins, Patrick. 2004. Mezzanine hits the Mittelstand. 
52 Der Spiegel. 2003. Deutsche Bank - Das Milliardengrab. 
53 Fromme, Herbert. 2004. Achleitner will mit Beteiligungen jonglieren können. 
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IV.6 Analysis: Migration in external finance of German corporates 
 With the exception of the development in bank lending, all anticipated trends could be 
verified through the analyses of the different product areas. This result is summarized in the 
following table.  
Table 6: Actual Development of External Finance Products 
 
Product area Expectation Result
Bank lending ▼ ►
Debt securities (amount outstanding) ▲ ▲
Equity securities (market capitalization) ▲ ▲
Alternative funding sources ▲ ▲
Investor pools ▲ ▲
Share ownership of financial institutions ▼ ▼  
 
 In summary, the analysis of the quantitative data shows that the share shift is taking place 
and that it is expected to accelerate in the years to come due to anticipated changes in the market 
environment. Going forward, this migration will have a high impact on the profitability and the 
competitiveness of financial institutions and corporations in Germany. In order to thrive in this 
market, the participants have to adapt to the changes and to anticipate the future market structure. 
This market structure will be analyzed in the following part of the report. 
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V. ANTICIPATED TRANSFORMATION OF INTERMEDIARIES AND 
CORPORATIONS 
 
V.1 Market shares of intermediaries in the migration to capital markets: The new players and 
the legacy banks 
 As it was analyzed in III.3, German banks are dominating bank lending and they still 
have the big chunk of the underwriting business. However, all the pressures and recent 
developments that were described previously are impacting the financial intermediaries, favoring 
those "in the flow" of debt, equity and M&A and harming those cultivating the classic (Haus-) 
banking relationships. It will be especially the Anglo-American and similarly positioned 
institutions which will benefit from the anticipated transformation of the German market for 
corporate finance. This is because they have a competitive advantage in the fluid capital system 
as opposed to most of the German legacy banks which are mainly focused on the dedicated 
capital system.54 
 Currently, there are four main groups of players on the German market for corporate 
finance: 1. Domestic private banks; 2. Savings and mutual banks; 3. Centralized refinancing 
institutions of the savings and mutual banks (i.e. Landesbanken and Genossenschaftliche 
Zentralbanken (GZBs)); 4. Anglo-American and other foreign institutions. However, since the 
savings and mutual banks transfer all their capital markets relevant clients to the Landesbanken 
and GZBs, group 2 can be excluded from the further analysis.  
                                                 
54 Walter, Ingo. European Economic Transition, Capital Markets and Investment Banking Competition. 2004. 
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 The following table shows the current strengths and weaknesses of the three groups on 
the German banking market which will play an important role in the anticipated migration to the 
capital markets. 
Table 7: Strength and weaknesses of the players on the German banking market 
 
Domestic Private Banks Landesbanken and GZBs
Anglo-American and other 
foreign institutions
Strengths: • Long-standing client 
relationships (Hausbank)
• Long-standing client 
relationships (Hausbank)
• International distribution 
capacities
• Domestic distribution through 
own investment fund 
companies
• Domestic distribution through 
own investment fund 
companies
• Market sensitivity
• Lending capacity • Lending capacity • M&A expertise
• Interlocked directorates • Access to innovative small 
players through vast network 
of savings and mutual banks
• Strong position in domestic 
market for equities and debt
Weaknesses: • Structural inefficiencies • Structural inefficiencies • Low penetration
• Concerns over cyclical bad-
debt provisions
• Concerns over cyclical bad-
debt provisions
• Sometimes, limited lending 
capabilities
• Reliance on state guarantees • Difficulties to access 
conservative Mittelstand 
companies
• Limited international 
distribution capactities
• Sometimes, lack of market 
sensitivity
• Lack of M&A expertise  
  
 Most of the domestic private banks have added significant capital markets capabilities to 
their lending-focused business model over the last decade. Thereby, they have built a dominant 
market position in equities and debt. However, apart from Deutsche Bank, they could not build a 
significant international presence. As a result of this, they are struggling with high bad-debt 
provisions arising from the economic slump of the German economy. In recent years the 
domestic private banks have been tackling their structural inefficiencies and bolstering their 
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relationships with the most attractive segments of corporate clients. Going forward, those 
measures should help them maintaining an important position in the German banking market.  
 Historically, the Landesbanken have been benefiting from the state guarantees that 
allowed them to lend money to corporations at unrivaled rates. However, with the abolition of 
these guarantees most of the banks will experience a significant drop in their credit rating, 
thereby losing the competitive advantage in bank lending. Therefore, their penetration of the 
corporate market in the coming years will depend on their efforts and positioning in the capital 
markets business. Currently, it appears that only a few of the institutions, such as Bayerische LB 
and LBBW, have already undergone the necessary strategic adjustments to succeed in this space.  
 Although they do not depend on the state guarantees, the situation for the GZBs is 
comparable to that of the Landesbanken. Their future success with corporate clients also depends 
on their positioning in capital markets related areas. After numerous reorganizations in recent 
years, the actual potential of the GZBs in these areas remains to be seen. 
 The Anglo-American institutions whose business model heavily relies on the fee-based 
business will be the main beneficiaries of the migration of corporate finance from banks to 
capital markets in Germany. While in the 1980s and 1990s, they mainly entered into the market 
through their M&A expertise, they have been gaining momentum in the underwriting business in 
recent years. Going forward, their international distribution capabilities and their intense 
coverage of corporate clients will help them to achieve a strong position in Germany.  
 However, capital markets financing in Germany will remain – more than anywhere else – 
a complementary product to the traditional bank lending. Therefore, in order to be successful not 
only in M&A but also in underwriting, foreign institutions will have to be willing to commit 
significant amounts from their own balance sheet. 
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 In summary, the ongoing migration process of corporate finance in Germany creates 
numerous additional requirements to the banks' business models. Since not all current players 
will fulfill these requirements, a concentration process in the market can be anticipated. Since 
this concentration process is likely to be comparable to what has been seen in the global 
wholesale and investment banking market, there will probably be about ten relevant players on 
the German market.55 Due to their competitive advantage in the fluid capital system, it can 
further be expected that the most international domestic private banks and foreign institutions 
with significant lending capabilities will be the most successful.56 
 
V.2 (Re-)Action of the regulatory bodies 
 The German regulatory bodies have acknowledged that the migration to the capital 
markets is indispensable for the competitiveness of its domestic corporations and financial 
institutions. Therefore, the German legislator has initiated numerous commissions and laws that 
are target to the modernization of the framework of the financial markets. 
 One of the most important measures – the German Corporate Governance Code – has 
been introduced in 2002. It has its legal foundations in the also newly created Transparency and 
Disclosure Law. The aim of the Code is to make Germany's corporate governance rules more 
transparent to both national and international investors, thus strengthening confidence in the 
management of German corporations.57 Among others the Code addresses criticisms such as the 
inadequate transparency of corporate governance and the inadequate independence of German 
supervisory boards. In order to adapt the Code to market changes, a Government Commission 
                                                 
55 See Table A3 in the Appendix on Global Wholesale Banking and Investment Banking Market Concentration. 
56 See Table A4 in the Appendix on Global Wholesale Banking and Investment Banking Rankings. 
57 Cromme, Gerhard. 2003. German Corporate Governance Code. 
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reviews it annually. This Code and the relating law create an important framework that will 
foster transparency and investors' understanding. 
 Furthermore, the legislator has reformed the tax treatment of both private equity firms 
and securitization transactions. For the former a law was introduced that creates legal security 
and will thereby attract investors who have previously shied away from the German market.58 In 
mid-2003, the legislator passed a bill that grants a preferential treatment of the "true sales" of 
assets in securitization transactions. This law will increase the competitiveness and the 
international comparability of the German securitization market. 
 Prior to 2004, hedge funds were not allowed to set up and market their business in 
Germany. According to the so-called "Investment Fund Modernization Law", this is now 
possible. As a result of this law, the market for alternative investments is expected to grow to 
€100 billion within the next five years.59 Although this development will not have a direct effect 
on corporate finance, the increased liquidity will make the German capital market more efficient. 
 In summary, the German regulators have shown their determination to prepare the banks 
and corporations for the ongoing change of the markets. Most of the introduced measures have 
got positive feedback from the parties involved. It is now up to the market players to effectuate 
the internal adjustments needed for a successful transition. 
 
V.3 Impact on the Hausbank system and corporate governance 
 Historically, the transparency and the disclosure of German corporations have been quite 
limited. This can be explained by the fact that most corporations were family owned and that 
they usually covered their capital needs through their banks. Those banks obtained the relevant 
                                                 
58 BVK e.V. 2003. BVK begrűβt BMF-Schreiben zur Besteuerung von Private Equity-Fonds. 
59 BAI e.V. 'Alternative investments' comprises both hedge fund and private equity investments. 
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information for their lending decisions through their close relationship with the management and 
/ or their membership in the supervisory board.  
 Due to the preferential relationship with their Hausbank, corporations were usually 
provided with the needed liquidity, even in difficult times. However, in the current competitive 
and regulatory environment (e.g. Basel II), banks are not able anymore to give this "option for 
liquidity" without compromising their profitability. Corporations therefore have to be aware that 
they need to replace the Hausbank system in one of two ways. First, this can be done by 
adequately priced loans from banks which gradually loose their insights through the board 
memberships. Second, the capital markets provide a wide variety of financing opportunities even 
for medium-sized companies.60 
 However, transparency and proper monitoring are prerequisites to take advantage of the 
two, aforementioned financing alternatives. As a result of this, there is both a strong need and a 
trend among German corporations to organize their corporate governance policies according to 
international standards. The German Corporate Governance Code described in V.2 is the basis of 
those changes. One of its major recommendations is the creation of a capital markets oriented 
disclosure policy. This will create the transparency that is needed to regularly cover the 
corporations' financing needs on the public market. 
 
VI. SUMMARY 
 The analysis has shown that global competition and pressures for systemic change are 
pushing the German dedicated capital system to the Anglo-American fluid capital system.  
                                                 
60 Walter, Ingo / Smith, Roy C. 2000. High Finance in the EURO-Zone, p. 92. 
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 The dedicated capital system has mainly historical reasons and is based on close bank-
corporate relationships. Through those relationships with its "Hausbank" German corporations 
have been able to secure debt as well as equity financing without getting exposed to the capital 
markets. This setup resulted in a marketplace that was heavily based on the insights of the 
powerful but hardly profitable banks and that was characterized by underdeveloped capital 
markets.  
 In recent years, however, changes in the competitive and legal environment have been 
promoting the transition towards the market system. As a result of those changes the domestic 
banking system cannot satisfy the financing needs of the German economy anymore. This has 
put pressure on companies to reorganize their corporate finance strategy by seeking broader 
ranges of financing. The growth of the institutional investor pools and the EURO launch have 
supported this reorganization. 
 The quantitative analysis of the instruments on the German capital market has proven that 
the expected transition process is actually happening. This holds not only true for the shift from 
bank lending to debt securities but also for alternative funding instruments such as private equity 
or securitization. 
 In order to be successful in this changing market, intermediaries and corporations have to 
adapt to the new system. With regard to financial institutions, the analysis has shown that it will 
be especially the U.S. firms and a handful of capital markets oriented German banks which will 
improve their market position. 
 With the support of the regulators, German corporations also try to adjust to the changing 
system. Namely, they are improving their corporate governance and transparency in order to be 
able to take advantage of the opportunities that capital markets oriented financing is offering. 
 57
 In summary, this analysis has shown that Germany has already departed in the transition 
process from the dedicated capital system to the fluid capital system. Although there are still 
structural and cultural obstacles the further migration can be expected. If this is executed well, it 
will increase the financial competitiveness of German corporations as well as financial 
institutions. Furthermore, it will have a significant impact on the way corporate finance is done 
in continental Europe. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1: Bank Lending in Germany61 
 
Bank lending to corporate and private households
(in EUR millions)
Total %-Change As % of GDP Short term Long term GDP
1995 1,722,760 95.7% 298,570 1,424,189 1,800,980
1996 1,853,112 7.6% 102.1% 315,545 1,537,568 1,815,255
1997 1,968,088 6.2% 106.8% 319,981 1,648,107 1,842,722
1998 2,118,593 7.6% 113.0% 338,094 1,780,498 1,874,094
1999 2,272,536 7.3% 119.0% 328,889 1,943,647 1,909,550
2000 2,386,848 5.0% 121.2% 348,217 2,038,631 1,968,620
2001 2,426,914 1.7% 122.1% 356,702 2,070,212 1,988,420
2002 2,411,607 -0.6% 121.0% 331,936 2,079,671 1,992,750
2003 2,414,466 0.1% 121.4% 317,455 2,097,011 1,988,820  
Table A2: Exemplary Shareholdings of Allianz AG62 
 
Selected Holdings Beginning 2000 End of 2003
(Allianz + Dresdner) (% owned) < 15% < 10% < 5% < 0%
Monachia 48.7 X
Beiersdorf 38.4 X
Munich Re 33.3 X
Hypovereinsbank 20.5 X
IKB 19.8 X
Karstadt 16.5 X
Dyckerhoff 15.4 X
Hauck & Aufhäuser 14.7 X
E.ON 12.1 X
BASF 11.3 X
RWE 11.2 X
Leifheit 10.1 X
Deutsche Börse 8.2 X
Continental 7.8 X
BMW 6.3 X
Deutsche Bank 5.6 X  
                                                 
61 Deutsche Bundesbank. 2002. Monatsbericht; Deutsche Bundesbank. 2004. Bankenstatistik. 
62 Allianz AG. 2003. Staying the Course. 
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Table A3: Global Wholesale Banking and Investment Banking Market Concentration63 
 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Top ten firms
% Market share 56.0% 64.2% 62.1% 59.5% 55.9% 72.0% 77.9% 77.0% 80.0% 741.0% 71.3% 72.0%
Herfindahl Index 327.8 459.4 434.1 403.0 464.6 572.1 715.9 664.0 744.0 603.0 549.4 595.3
Number of firms from:
USA 5 9 9 9 8 8 7 8 7 7 7 7
Europe 5 1 1 1 2 2 3 2 3 3 3 3
Japan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Top twenty firms
% Market share 80.5% 75.6% 78.1% 76.0% 81.2% 93.3% 97.1% 96.3% 97.5% 91.5% 91.0% 93.1%
Herfindahl Index 392.7 478.4 481.4 439.5 517.6 620.9 764.0 709.0 784.0 639.0 591.1 603.4
Number of firms from:
USA 8 15 15 14 14 13 11 12 8 8 9 9
Europe 11 4 5 5 6 7 8 8 11 11 11 11
Japan 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0  
Table A4: Global Wholesale Banking and Investment Banking Rankings 200364 
 
Firm Rank 2003
Firm 
Rank 
2002
Syndicated 
Bank Loans
Global Debt 
U/W & 
Private 
Placements
Global 
Equity U/W 
& Private 
Placements
M&A 
Advisory 
Completed
MTNs 
Arranged Total Share
1 JPM-Chase-Bank One 1 426,870 345,446 31,728 243,370 32,277 1,079,691 11.5%
2 Citigroup 2 251,706 449,984 42,911 240,672 28,333 1,013,606 10.8%
3 Goldman Sachs & Co 3 19,152 225,333 41,541 446,222 26,103 758,351 8.1%
4 Morgan Stanley 7 10,180 317,365 37,134 275,730 13,500 653,909 7.0%
5 Merrill Lynch & Co Inc 6 14,699 238,287 50,234 238,723 85,662 627,605 6.7%
6 Deutsche Bank AG 4 92,974 282,330 19,262 136,940 30,215 561,721 6.0%
7 Banc of America / Fleet Boston 8 243,630 189,618 13,106 94,303 13,659 554,316 5.9%
8 Credit Suisse First Boston 5 41,224 290,722 23,614 182,823 8,011 546,394 5.8%
9 Lehman Brothers 9 15,277 306,152 14,524 163,099 9,100 508,152 5.4%
10 UBS 10 13,017 243,374 35,459 168,378 - 460,228 4.9%
11 ABN AMRO 12 48,739 99,043 2,713 38,348 74,344 263,187 2.8%
12 Barclays Capital 13 78,746 134,953 511 - 32,165 246,375 2.6%
13 Bear Stearns & Co Inc 11 - 173,081 3,775 39,556 20,896 237,308 2.5%
14 BNP Paribas SA 14 50,079 81,343 3,717 57,915 - 193,054 2.1%
15 Royal Bank of Scotland 18 38,747 142,791 - - 3,511 185,049 2.0%
Industry Total 2,166,310 4,290,434 412393 1639280 884824 9,393,241
Top 5 as % of Total 33.4% 36.7% 49.4% 88.1% 21.0% 44.0%
Top 15 as % of Total 62.1% 82.0% 77.7% 141.9% 42.7% 84.0%
 
                                                 
63 Walter, Ingo. European Economic Transition, Capital Markets and Investment Banking Competition. 2004. 
64 Walter, Ingo. European Economic Transition, Capital Markets and Investment Banking Competition. 2004. 
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